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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
The Petitioners/Appellants are Pen & Ink, LLC and David Lynton 
The Respondent/Appellee is Alpine City 
The Plaintiff in Intervention is the Willow Canyon Homeowner's Association 
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Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals reviews a district court's grant 
or denial of summary judgment for correctness, affording no deference to the 
district court. Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, \ 5, 156 P.3d 175. 
When the Court of Appeals reviews a district court's decision on a petition 
to review decision of a local land use authority, the Court of Appeals acts as if it 
were reviewing the land use authority's decision directly and the district court's 
decision is afforded no deference. Like the initial review by the district court, The 
Court of Appeals review is limited to whether a land use authority's decision is 
"arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85,111, 200 P.3d 
182. 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
ARE DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. 10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative 
remedies exhausted ~ Time for filing — Tolling of time ~ Standards governing 
court review — Record on review — Staying of decision. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision 
made under this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this 
chapter, until that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies as 
provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of 
or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision is 
final. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date 
a property owner files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with 
the property rights ombudsman under Section 13-43-204 until 30 days after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
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(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 
13-43-204 (3)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator. 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific 
constitutional taking issue that is the subject of the request for arbitration filed with 
the property rights ombudsman by a property owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman after the 
time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect the time 
to file a petition. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of 
this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative 
discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, 
ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time 
the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the 
municipality takes final action on a land use application for any adversely affected 
third party, if the municipality conformed with the notice provisions of Part 2, 
Notice, or for any person who had actual notice of the pending decision. 
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the 
enactment of a land use ordinance or general plan may not be filed with the district 
court more than 30 days after the enactment. 
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal 
authority's decision is final. 
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall 
transmit to the reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, 
findings, orders, and, if 
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a 
true and correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record 
6 
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provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the 
land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was 
offered to the land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the court 
determines that it was improperly excluded. 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use 
authority or authority appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(b) (i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or 
arbitration of a constitutional taking issue under Section 13-43-204, the aggrieved 
party may petition the appeal authority to stay its decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its 
decision stayed pending district court review if the appeal authority finds it to be in 
the best interest of the municipality. 
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or 
arbitration of a constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 13-43-204, the 
petitioner may seek an injunction staying the appeal authority's decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter arises out of the Petitioners' (hereinafter referred to collectively 
as the Landowner) request for the district court to review a land use decision made 
by the Alpine City Council. The Landowner applied to Alpine City for approval of 
a site plan for residential construction on the foothills in Alpine City. The 
Landowner's site plan proposed constructing a home, and adjacent structures and 
facilities, which would result in approximately 90,000 square feet of disturbance of 
the natural landscape on the proposed building site. The Alpine City Council, 
relying on an agreement signed by the previous owners of the Landowner's 
7 
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( 
property, limited the allowed disturbance of the natural landscape to 60,000 square 
feet or less. ' 
Pursuant to Utah Code 10-9a-801 (7)(a) the City filed its record of 
proceedings in this matter with the Fourth District Court. The district court, under 
Utah Code 10-9a-801(3) had determined that there was substantial evidence in the 
City's record of proceeding to support the City's decision and therefore the City's 
decision in this regard was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The following material and undisputed facts are established from the Record 
of Proceedings of Alpine City on this matter and are contained in the Record on 
Appeal. 
1. The Landowner's property was previously owned by an individual known in 
the record as Robert Strang. (R. pg. 182; City's Record of Proceedings pg. 
65) 
2. Mr. Strang, in consideration for his property being annexed into Alpine City 
so that the property could be developed, signed an Annexation Agreement 
with the City and others. (R. pgs 238, 225; City's Record of Proceedings 
pgs. 15,28) 
8 
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3. Fhe signal] ire b lock foi I'V ft Sti a ng reads a s follov si ' " " I he i indersiened 
Owner of property in Utah County hereby accepts the condition-; * the 
proceeding (sic) Annexation Agreement of the "Freeze/Chrysalis/Sundial 
W iiiow Canyon Annexation Application" which compromises (sic) seven 
i TMgev louai^r *\ tin annexalion piai duo development plan also attached 
i'-.^!' * >. J ^ i : • * xoeord ol Proceedings pg. 15) 
H. m e Annexa t ion \ovci>\\--.*••> * < - h office of the I. Jtah Count) 
Recorder (R. pgs. 251-213, Cit>"s Record of Proceedings pgs. 2- 40) an- :i 
included a proposed, preliminary development plan (R. pg. 244; City's 
Record of Proceedings pg. 9) which showed the initial location and size oi 
the proposed Strang building site. (R. pg. 244 and 185; City's Record -.»f 
Proceedings pg. "IL>, diul [>JJ fi '"• l 
preliminary development plan was 405000 sc*ian/ 'b * *' ^ - ,; 
...Record of Proceedings pg. 9). 
6. The preliminary development plan provided that a11 of the Strang property, 
except [ , -" '» i{- -,wv.;;!v ivvi ;• aiding sue, \u uk; he field as undeveloped 
cpcr •*; . * • ,;-i ;,is^[!!c .. :), .v. .*\\ a puone enf-:\ '-;. 
pgs 249,, 248 { md 244; Cil ) 's R < xi )i i 3 < if Pi < x .i sedings pgs , 4 5 a:i : .d 9) 
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7. The Annexation Agreement provided that one half of the 40,000 square feet 
lot on the Strang property must be left undisturbed. (Annexation Agreement ' 
1J5.B.; R. pg. 250; City's Record of Proceedings pg. 3). 
8. The Annexation Agreement provided that the City could adjust the , 
boundaries of the 40,000 square foot building site and make other minor lot 
line adjustments. (Annexation Agreement, [^1. at R. pg. 232; City's Record 
of Proceedings pg. 21) 
9. There were three other owners of properties subject to the same restrictions 
as the Strang property. They were known as the Kester, Bushman, and 
Redpoint. (Annexation Agreement, TJ6.B.1, at R. pg. 248 and 87; City's 
Record of Proceedings pg. 5, and pg. 156) 
10. Two of these four (Kester, and Bushman properties) were allowed by the 
City to develop with a 60,000 square foot site plan, 30,000 square feet of 
disturbance of the natural landscape, and with an open space easement over 
the remainder of their property. The third (Redpoint) has yet to develop its 
property. (R. pgs. 87,105-102, 99; City's Record of Proceedings pgs. 156, 
140-143, 146) 
11. A fifth property, owned by the Silbeys, and developed as the Van Leeuwen 
home has been allowed by the City to have 60,000 square feet of disturbance 
10 
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of the natural landscape with the remainder preserved from development in 
an a open space easement. (R. pgs. 185, 86, 92; City's Record of 
Proceedings pgs. 63,157, 150) 
12. The Landowner applied for approximately 90,000 square feet of 
disturbance of the natural landscape. (R. pg. 209; City's Record of 
Proceedings pg. 43). 
13.The Alpine City council agreed to allow 60,000 square feet of disturbance of 
the natural landscape, the same as the maximum allowed on the most 
disturbed parcel governed by the Annexation Agreement that had been 
previously developed. (R. pg. 84; City's Record of Proceedings pg. 159) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The decision of the City to limit the Landowners site plan to no more 
than 60,000 square feet of land disturbance was supported by substantial evidence 
and was justified by an annexation and development agreement that was binding on 
the Landowner. 
11 
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< 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD IN UPHOLDING 
THE CITY'S LAND USE DECISION REGARDING THE LANDOWNER'S 
SITE PLAN AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE. 
The Landowner's argument on appeal appears to be confusing the issue of 
whether the City's land use decision was supported by substantial evidence in the 
City's record, with the standards for granting or denying a summary judgment in a 
normal civil case. 
The Landowner brought this matter as a petition to review the City's 
decision under Utah Code Annotated 10-9a-801(2007). (Petition found at R. pg. 
77). This matter was brought before the court for decision through the process of 
cross motions for summary judgment, but this option to bring the matter to the 
attention of the district court for a ruling did not change the fundamental nature of 
the case from that of a petition to review City's land use decision, which is 
governed by the provisions of state code. 
A district court's review of a land use authority's decision is limited to 
whether a land use authority's decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." A City 
land use authority's decision is arbitrary or capricious only if it is not "supported by 
12 
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substantial evidence in the record." Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, f 11, 200 P.3d 
182 (footnotes omitted). 
In determining whether substantial evidence supports a land use authority's 
decision, "the district court's review is limited to the record provided by the land 
use authority or appeal authority." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(8)(a)(i) (2007). 
Moreover, the district court is required to "presume that a decision . . . is valid" and 
"determine only whether or not the decision . . . is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." 
Id. § 10-9a-801(3)(a). Finally, the land use authority's final decision "is valid if 
the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record." Id. § 10-9a-
801(3)(c). Substantial evidence is defined as "that quantum and quality of relevant 
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." 
Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, \ 15, 70 P.3d 47 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Utah Code Annotated 10-9a-801(8)(2007) provides that if a record of the 
City's proceedings has been provided to the court, then the district court must 
make the determination solely on the record before it, and may not accept or 
consider any evidence outside the record. A substantial Record of Proceedings 
before the City was filed with the district court in this case. The district court 
found that record sufficient for it to determine whether the City's decision in this 
13 
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i 
matter was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore factual disputes, if they 
do exist, did not prevent the district court, or this Court, from ruling on the petition < 
to review the City's land use decision. 
This is consistent with the decision in Pacific West Communities, Inc. v.
 ( 
Grantsville City, 2009 UT App 291, P 3d , wherein the Court of Appeals 
stated that it was inappropriate for a district court, when considering a petition to 
review a land use decision under Utah Code Annotated 10-9a-801(2007), to 
consider evidence not presented to the City's land use authority or appeal 
authority. Pacific West Communities, Inc. v. Grantsville City, 2009 UT App 291, 
P3d , at fflj 17,18. 
If it were inappropriate in the Pacific West cast for a district court to 
consider affidavits which were not presented to the City in the land use application 
process, it certainly would have been inappropriate for the district court in this case 
to find, as the Landowner's brief is now arguing, that there were facts in dispute 
that prevented the district court from reviewing the City's decision. The task of the 
district court in this matter was the same as that now of the Court of Appeals. That 
task is to review the City's land use decision to determine whether or not it was 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
14 
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The City's decision is either supported by substantial evidence in the record 
of proceedings before the City, or it is not. The Landowner's ability to point to 
facts which it believes it can dispute is not relevant or determinative of the issue of 
whether or not the City's decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
POINT TWO 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
THE CITY DECISION TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF LAND DISTURBANCE ON 
THE SITE PLAN PROPOSED BY THE LANDOWNER. 
This court is reviewing is the City's decision to deny the Landowner's 
request for approval of a residential site plan which would disturb more than 
60,000 square feet of the natural landscape on the foothills of Alpine City. 
This issue came before the Alpine City Council because the Landowner's 
proposed site plan lies within an area that is subject to a recorded Annexation 
Agreement. The Landowner's predecessor in the property entered into this 
agreement with the City in order to get the property annexed into the City. 
Included in the Record of Proceedings before Alpine City was the Annexation 
Agreement that covers the property of the Landowner. (R. at pgs. 251 -213). It is 
undisputed that this agreement was recorded against the property with the Utah 
County Recorder's office. 
15 
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During its review of this matter the City relied on the provisions of the 
Annexation Agreement to support its decision. The Annexation Agreement ( 
contains the following provision: 
Project Development Plan. The owners consent to agree to be 
bound by the general provisions of the development plan which 
is Attachment B to the annexation policy declaration. 
The owners further agree that all preliminary and final 
development plans shall substantially conform to the design set 
forth in the Plan. However, the City may approve minor 
adjustments of lot lines, street locations and similar details in the , 
preliminary and final plat approval process where considered 
necessary to more adequately conform to zoning or subdivision 
regulations or improve the overall design of the project. 
The owners agree that all further preliminary and final plans 
subsequently submitted in support of an application for 
development approval of the property shall be in substantial 
compliance with the development plan requirements and 
conditions of annexation set forth in the annexation policy 
declaration and this agreement. The City may consider 
alternative plans substantially in compliance with the Project 
Development Plan but reducing over all development. (R. at pg. 
232; Annexation Agreement, ^[1. at City's Record of Proceedings 
pg.R.21). 
The above quoted section of the Annexation Agreement contains two 
particularly relevant provisions to the issues before this Court. First, the signing 
land owners agreed to be bound by the general provisions of a specific 
development plan which was attachment B to a document identified in the 
Agreement as the Annexation Policy Declaration and second, the landowners and 
16 
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City agreed that the City could approve minor modifications to the development 
plan. 
At the time of this annexation, Utah law provided that a City was required to 
adopt an Annexation Policy Declaration as a pre-condition for any annexation. 
(See former Utah Code 10-2-414 (1996)). The policy declaration for the 
annexation that included Landowner's land, and which is referred to in the 
recorded Annexation Agreement, contains a preliminary development plan, called 
attachment B. This plan was recorded with the Annexation Agreement and is 
located at page 9 of the Record of the City's Proceedings filed with the District 
Court. (R. at pg. 244). 
The Annexation Agreement also contained its own attachment which is a 
development plan. Contrary to the argument of the Landowner, this development 
plan was part of the Annexation Agreement and is specifically referred to in the 
Annexation Agreement. The signature block, signed by the Landowner's 
predecessors in the land, states that, "[t]he undersigned Owner of property in Utah 
County hereby accepts the conditions of the proceeding Annexation Agreement of 
the 'Freeze/Chrysalis/Sundial Willow Canyon Annexation Application' which 
compromises (sic) seven (7) pages, together with annexation plat and development 
plan also attached as exhibit "A" and "B"."(R. pg. 238). The Agreement, as 
17 
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recorded with the Utah County Recorder's office, is indeed seven pages with two 
attachments—the annexation map and a development plan. (An addendum and ( 
Amendment to the Agreement was also recorded) This development plan referred 
to was found on page 9 of the Record of Proceedings before the City which was , 
filed with the District Court. (R. at pg. 244) 
This development plan attached as an exhibit to the Annexation Agreement 
clearly indicates an approximate approved location for a lot on the Landowner's 
Property and that the lot was to be 40,000 square feet in size. It also indicates that 
all remaining property of the Landowner was to be held in open space. This 
material and information was presented to both the Planning Commission and City 
Council when the decision on the size of the Landowner's developed lot was 
discussed and considered. (See R. at pg. 244) 
The application of the Landowner was for a building lot site plan that 
contained approximately 90,000 square feet of disturbance to the natural 
landscape. (R. at pg. 209) While the City did not approve the application for a 
90,000 square foot lot size, it did vote to allow a modification to the Annexation 
Agreement for a 60,000 square foot area of disturbance. (R. pg. 84; City's Record 
of Proceedings pg. 159). This decision was not arbitrary or capricious because it 
resulted in the Landowner having the same rights and benefits granted to the other 
18 
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land owners in a similar situation. This decision was also based on the documents 
in the record of the proceeding in the City. The decision was consistent with the 
Annexation Agreement, which gives the City Council the authority to approve 
minor adjustments to lot lines from the original development plan. (Annexation 
Agreement, | 1 . at R. 232) 
The City's decision was based on two substantive documents, portions of 
which were considered by the Planning Commission and City Council in making 
the City's decision in this matter. The primary document is the Annexation 
Agreement which Landowner's memorandum conceded was an enforceable 
contract. (Page 15 of Landowner's Responsive Memorandum to summary 
Judgment Record on Appeal page 477) The secondary document is an Annexation 
Policy adopted by the City as part of the annexation process. It is undisputed that 
the Annexation Agreement was recorded with the office of the Utah County 
Recorder. This Annexation Agreement clearly refers to, and gives notice of the 
Annexation Policy. (See R. at pgs. 251, 250 and 248; City's Record of Proceeding 
at pgs 2, 3 and 5) The City Planning Commission had the attachment B of the 
Annexation Policy in front of it when they considered the issue and it was part of 
its considerations and recommendation to the City Council. (See R. at pgs 174, 
173, 168, and City's Record of Proceedings at pgs 72, 73 and 78). The City 
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Council had the Planning Commission recommendations and the attachment B of 
the Annexation Policy in front of it when it made its decision. (See R. at pgs. 87 
and 86; City's Record of Proceedings at pgs 156 and 157) 
The Annexation Agreement clearly requires the land owners to agree to be 
bound by the general provisions of a specific development plan which was 
attachment B to the Annexation Policy. It was represented to The City Planning 
Commission and City Council that what is page 244 of the Record (Preliminary 
Plat of Willow Canyon Subdivision) is a copy of the attachment B to the 
Annexation Policy. (R. pgs. 174-172; City's Record of Proceedings pgs. 72-74) 
The Landowner has not challenged this representation. The City, in reliance on 
the attachment B, made its decision in this matter. 
The Annexation Agreement also contained an attachment which is a 
development plan labeled as the Preliminary Plat of Willow Canyon Subdivision. 
Contrary to the argument of the Landowner, this development plan was part of the 
Annexation Agreement and is specifically referred to in the Annexation 
Agreement. The signature block, signed by the Landowner's predecessors in the 
land, states that, "[t]he undersigned Owner of property in Utah County hereby 
accepts the conditions of the proceeding (sic) Annexation Agreement of the 
'Freeze/Chrysalis/Sundial Willow Canyon Annexation Application' which 
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compromises (sic) seven (7) pages, together with annexation plat and development 
plan also attached as exhibit "A" and "B"."(R. pg. 238; City's Record of 
Proceedings pg. 15) The Landowner is apparently disavowing its obligation to 
comply with this plan because it was recorded out of order and not labeled as an 
exhibit, but they cite no law to support their disavowal. 
It is clear from the recorded Agreement that it contained seven pages with 
two attachments—the annexation map and a development plan. (An addendum and 
Amendment to the Agreement was also recorded) and it is clear from the 
development plan that all property outside of the proposed 40,000 square foot lots 
would held in open space. This material and information was presented to both the 
Planning Commission and City Council when the decision on the size of the 
Petitioner's developed lot was discussed and considered. (See R. pgs. 244, 185, 
182, 174, 173, and 86; City's Record of Proceedings pgs. 9, 63, 65, 72, 73, and 
157) The application of the Petitioner was for a building lot site plan that 
contained approximately 90,000 square feet of disturbance to the natural 
landscape. (R. pg. 209) There was substantial evidence in the record before the 
» 
City Council that this was inconsistent with the Annexation Agreement. 
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POINT THREE 
THE LANDOWNER HAD EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE < 
THAT IT WAS LIMITED IN THE AMOUNT OF ITS PROPERTY THAT 
COULD BE DEVELOPED AND DISTURBED BY DEVELOPMENT. 
It is undisputed that the Annexation Agreement, along with the preliminary
 ( 
plan, was recorded against the property. A covenant in a contract is enforceable 
against subsequent purchasers of the ground (runs with the ground) if it has the 
following characteristics: (1) it must touch and concern the land; (2) the parties 
must intend the covenant to run with the land; (3) there must be privity of estate; 
and (4) the agreement must be in writing. (See Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. 
Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 at 622, 623 (Utah 1989) and Canyon Meadows 
Home Owners Assoc, v. Wasatch Cty, 2001 UT App 414, 40 P.3d 1148 at 1152). 
There is no issue that the covenant in question touches and concerns the ground, 
nor should there any issue that the intent of the parties to the original contract was 
that it would run with the ground. The agreement specifically provides that it will 
run with the ground. (Annexation Agreement, f 14 at R. pg. 245) There also is no 
dispute about privity of estate or that the agreement is in writing. 
The Landowner, however, does dispute that the requirements can be 
enforced against it. The argument raised by the Landowner is that the 
development plan, designated as attachment B to the Annexation Policy 
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Declaration, was not recorded and they therefore did not have actual or 
constructive notice of the land use restrictions contained in attachment B. It is the 
City's position that it did have constructive notice of the limitations on the use of 
their property established by the Annexation Agreement. 
In Utah constructive notice can take two forms. First, pursuant to the 
recording statute, constructive notice is imparted when documents are properly 
recorded. Second, constructive notice arises from a duty to inquire when one has 
"knowledge of certain facts and circumstances." First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. 
Ranch, Inc., 966 P. 2d 834, 837-38 (Utah 1998). This second type of notice is 
referred to as "inquiry notice." See id. at 837. "[I]nquiry notice 'occur[s] when 
circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require 
further inquiry on his part.'" Id. at 838 (citation omitted; second alteration in 
original). "Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his 
guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have 
led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be 
deemed conversant of it." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
The Annexation Agreement was recorded. This recordation gave the 
Landowner the following constructive notices: 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. The City had adopted an annexation policy. (Annexation Agreement, first 
Whereas, at R. pg. 251; City's Record of Proceedings pg. 2) 
2. The City would only annex if there was a development plan agreed upon 
prior to annexation. (Annexation Agreement, second Whereas, at R. pg. 251; 
City's Record of Proceedings pg. 2). 
3. The development plan was attached as an attachment B to the policy 
declaration. (Annexation Agreement, ^[1. at R. pg. 232; City's Record of 
Proceedings pg. 21) 
4. The property owners who signed the Agreement agreed to be bound by the 
general provisions of the development plan which was attachment B to the 
Annexation Policy Declaration. (Annexation Agreement, <fll. at R. pg. 232; 
City's Record of Proceedings pg. 21) • ,, . . 
5. The property owners who signed the Agreement agreed that a substantial 
portion of their property would be kept as open space and that this open 
space was shown on the attachment B to the policy declaration. (Annexation 
Agreement, [^6. at R. pgs. 249, 248; City's Record of Proceedings pgs. 4, 5) 
6. The open space as shown on attachment B on the Strang property (now 
Landowner's property) would be preserved by use of a conservation 
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easement which would severally limit the use of the Strang property. (R. 
pgs. 249, 248) 
7. The property owners who signed the Agreement, including Landowner's 
predecessor in interest, acknowledged that the Agreement included an 
attached development plan and they accepted the conditions of that 
development plan. (Annexation Agreement, signature blocks at R. pgs. 243-
234; City's Record of Proceedings pgs. 10-19) 
8. The development plan recorded with the Annexation Agreement shows one 
40,000 square foot lot on Landowner' property with the remainder as open 
area. (R. at pg. 244; City's Record of Proceedings pgs 9) 
All of the above was a matter of record with the Recorder's Office of Utah County 
and the Landowner's had constructive notice of these provisions which gave it 
inquiry notice of the existence of a Annexation Policy Declaration with an agreed 
upon development plan. 
The above listed recorded provisions are therefore binding on the 
Landowner as the successors of the Strangs. In addition, the development plan, 
which is identical to the attachment B of the Annexation Policy Declaration, was 
recorded with the Annexation Agreement. (R. pg. 244) While it is true that this 
recorded preliminary plat was not specifically labeled in the recorded document as 
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the attachment B of the Annexation Policy Declaration, the references in the 
recorded agreement to the annexation policy and its attachment B are sufficient to ' 
put the Landowner on constructive notice of the existence of the Annexation 
Policy Declaration and its provisions limiting development. 
The Landowner, at the time it purchased the property, had constructive 
notice of the existence of the Annexation Policy Declaration and the existence of a 
development plan known as attachment B which could severally limit the use of its 
property. It should now still be held to those limitations. The Landowner 
completely ignores the fact that the preliminary plan (attachment B) contained a 
specific legal description of the property it encompassed, which legal description 
included the Strang property. (R. at pg. 244) It is presumed common sense that the 
Landowner knew or should have known the legal description of their property and 
where it is located within the larger parcel described as the preliminary plan. 
The Landowner's reliance on the case of Meyer v. General American Corp. 
569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that it did not have a duty to inquire 
at the City about what the Annexation Policy contained is misplaced. This case 
does not stand for the proposition the Landowner cites it for. It appears to be a 
case involving personal property and security interests and not interests in land or 
constructive notice of limitations on land uses. 
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In addition the Landowner's argument that The City did not rely on, or 
produce, the relevant portions of the Annexation Policy is in error. It is clear from 
the record of proceedings before the City that the Planning Commission had in 
front of them the attachment B to the annexation policy declaration (R. pgs. 174-
171; City's Record of Proceedings pgs. 72-74). 
CONCLUSION 
The City's decision to limit the Landowner to 60,000 square feet of 
disturbance of the natural landscape on its site plan was supported by substantial 
evidence in the record before the City. It was not arbitrary or capricious and not 
illegal. The City's decision should be upheld. 
Dated this 2H^ day of J W ^ - , 2009. 
David L. Church 
Attorney for Respondent/ Appellee 
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